The Tyranny of Values or the Tyranny of One-Party States? by Scheppele, Kim Lane
The Tyranny of Values or the Tyranny
of One-Party States?
Kim Lane Scheppele 2019-11-25T19:06:22
In his contribution ‘Fundamentals on Defending European Values,’ Armin von
Bogdandy counsels caution. The Treaty on European Union may have included
legally operative fundamental principles that are the ‘true foundations of the common
European house,’ but enforcing these principles strictly could bring the house down.
Von Bogdandy darkly recalls Carl Schmitt’s warning about a ‘tyranny of values’
which, he reminds us, is ‘a defense of values which destroys the very values it aims
to protect.’
As von Bogdandy argues, there are important values on the other side. Under Article
4(2) TEU, the EU must respect domestic democracy and constitutional identity – and
this commitment requires the EU to tolerate normative pluralism. Moreover, the EU
has always stood for peace, and attempting to enforce a common set of values too
strongly at a delicate moment may lead to explosive conflict. While von Bogdandy
recognizes that EU cannot exist without a common foundation of values and he
acknowledges that Article 7 TEU is a cumbersome mechanism for enforcement
of those values that requires supplementation, the thought of the EU pressing a
Member State to conform to EU values when it is determined to head in a different
direction nonetheless makes him queasy.
Von Bogdandy’s arguments are wise in normal times. The EU has long looked the
other way while Member States have engaged in normative freelancing, and the
EU has previously been rewarded when these states (France under de Gaulle and
Italy under Berlusconi, for example) have returned to the European fold through
the normal democratic rotation of power. But we no longer live in normal times.
The current governments of at least two Member States, Hungary and Poland, are
engaged in normative freelancing with the explicit aim of making future democratic
rotation impossible, so the self-correction mechanisms on which previous ‘normal
times’ have relied will no longer work. Moreover, these rogue governments are
not taking their citizens out of the normative embrace of the European Union
because their citizens have demanded that these governments do so. The rogue
governments we see today are undermining the values of the European Union when
the EU is more popular in these Member States than their own governments are.
Take Hungary, which is no longer a democratic state because its citizens can no
longer change the government when they so desire. In 2010, Prime Minister Viktor
Orbán’s Fidesz party came to power with an absolute majority of the votes in a free
and fair election, but due to the inherited disproportionate election system, the 53%
of the vote gained by Fidesz turned into 67% of the parliamentary seats. Under
the Hungarian constitution that Orbán also inherited, a single two-thirds vote in
the unicameral parliament could change the constitution as well as the so-called
“two-thirds laws” that governed important aspects of Hungary’s basic governmental
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structure and human rights. Orbán’s constitutional majority allowed him to govern
without legal constraint, and he won this constitutional majority again in 2014 and
2018. But while Orbán has maintained two-thirds of the parliamentary seats for
nearly a decade, he has never had anywhere close to two-thirds of the public behind
him. Instead, his party generally hovers at around one-third popular support. What
is perhaps most shocking is that there are usually even more people who do not
support any of the existing political parties.1) In considering survey data of out
Hungary, it is important to ask what the survey researcher has done with the “don’t
knows” on the question pertaining to support for the government. Not surprisingly,
Fidesz generally omits the “don’t knows” and reports their support among “decided”
voters, where its numbers are much higher. But having such large fractions of voters
refuse to align with any party is a sign of democratic deficiency all by itself and
worthy of reporting.  In the population as a whole, supporters of Fidesz rarely top
40% and instead hover around 35%.
Source: Political Capital (quarterly average based on the polls of Medián, Néz#pont
Institute, Publicus, Republikon, Századvég, Tárki and Závecz Research), February
9, 2018. (The black line is far-right Jobbik, the red line is the Socialist Party.  The
blue and green lines are for the Democratic Coalition and Politics can be Different,
both left-leaning parties.)
So how does Orbán win such overwhelming victories in Hungarian elections?
Through election law tricks. In December 2011, the Parliament enacted a
controversial election law that gerrymandered all-new electoral districts. In 2013,
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another new election law made the electoral system even more disproportionate, by
increasing the proportion of single-member constituency mandates and eliminating
the second round run-off in these constituencies so that the seats could be won by
much less than a majority vote. The law also introduced ‘winner-compensation,’
which favored the governing party in the tallying of party list votes and managed
to suppress the vote of ex-pats who had left under pressures from Orbán’s
tightening control while allowing in the votes of new citizens in the neighboring
states who backed Orbán.2)For details of the voting rules that applied first in the
2014 election and were kept largely the same for the 2018 election, see Kim Lane
Scheppele, Hungary: An Election in Question, Part 1: The Political Landscape
(NY Times, Feb 28, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/NB4R-UMWQ  (laying out
the distribution of political forces that were the object of gaming in the election
rules); Kim Lane Scheppele, Hungary, an Election in Question, Part 2: Writing the
Rules to Win—the Basic Structure (NY Times, Feb 28, 2014), archived at http://
perma.cc/95M5-6573  (showing how a combination of gerrymandering and new
rules awarding parliamentary seats tilted the election in the governing party’s favor);
Kim Lane Scheppele, Hungary, an Election in Question, Part 3: Compensating
the Winners (NY Times, Feb 28, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/U39T-9VMP
  (showing how the majority party turned its margin of victory into a supermajority
result and interfered with the independence of the Election Commission); Kim
Lane Scheppele, Hungary, An Election in Question, Part 4: The New Electorate
(in Which Some Are More Equal than Others) (NY Times, Feb 28, 2014), archived
at http://perma.cc/69HC-4XJ5  (showing how nearly half a million voters were
disenfranchised and a different half million new voters were added to the voter
rolls, while a clever system to divert minority votes to ethnic lists was designed to
ensure that ethnic minorities would never gain any parliamentary seats); Kim Lane
Scheppele, Hungary, An Election in Question, Part 5: The Unequal Campaign (NY
Times, Feb 28, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/63D5-9MST  (showing how the
campaign rules and the election authorities themselves benefited the governing
party). With this rigged electoral system Fidesz was able to renew its two-thirds
majority both in 2014 and 2018 with less than a majority of the popular vote.
The OSCE election observers were very critical of both the 2014 and 2018 elections,
noting that “overlap between state and ruling party resources,” as well as opaque
campaign finance, media bias, and “intimidating and xenophobic rhetoric” also
hampered voters’ ability to make informed choices. A study of the rural population
in Hungary in the 2014 election found that the government used the threat of
withdrawal of public employment to leverage votes for Fidesz. Research done in
conjunction with the 2018 election found numerous irregularities, including busloads
of voters brought in from neighboring countries to vote in Hungary as well as
widespread vote buying and intimidation. The election office computer crashed on
the night of the 2018 election and numerous election officials reported irregularities
in the registering of their election logs. In both 2014 and 2018, Orbán got just exactly
the number of seats he needed to keep his two-thirds majority, needing every trick
he played. While it’s true that Orbán Fidesz party has remained more popular than
any other single party and Fidesz would have “won” the election in any event, Orbán
would never have gotten his consistent two-thirds majorities without rigging the
election laws.
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Beyond rigging the electoral law, Fidesz made the playing field even more uneven
by dismantling independent media and threatening civil society. Whenever an
opposition party starts to show that it might challenge Orbán, it is ridiculed in the
Fidesz-controlled media, investigated by the Fidesz-controlled State Audit Office
(and often fined), and harassed by the Fidesz-controlled Election Commission.
Without the ability to gain attention through independent media or to find a base in
civil society, it is hard for any coherent opposition to form in the first place. As Steven
Levitsky and Lucan Way have argued: “Clearly, Hungary is not a democracy…
Orbán’s Hungary is a prime example of a competitive autocracy with an uneven
playing field.”
Rousseau may have inspired Carl Schmitt’s concept of democracy, but the
mysterious ‘general will’ is now used by autocratic nationalists like Viktor Orbán to
build an ‘illiberal democracy’ that he claims Hungarians support. Illiberalism is highly
critical towards all democratic values, including those currently enshired in Article
2 TEU as well as in Article 4(2) TEU. Orbán’s isn’t merely illiberal in not respecting
human dignity, minorities’ and individual’s rights, the rule of law and separation of
powers, but he isn’t democratic either, because the outcome of the elections are
foreordained.
Orbán’s Hungary isn’t only a ‘pseudo-democracy,’ but it also abuses the concept
of national identity protected in Article 4(2) TEU. From the very beginning, the
government of Viktor Orbán has justified non-compliance with the values enshrined
in Article 2 TEU by referring to national sovereignty. Nowhere has this been clearer
than when the government refused to accept refugees in the giant migration of 2015,
and also refused to cooperate with the European relocation plan for refugees after
that. After a failed referendum in which the Hungarian public refused to support
the Orbán government in sufficient numbers as it sought a public rubber-stamp
for its rejection of refugees, the packed Constitutional Court came to the rescue of
Hungary’s policies on migration by asserting that they were part of the country’s
constitutional identity.
The Constitutional Court in its decision held that ‘the constitutional self-identity
of Hungary is a fundamental value not created by the Fundamental Law – it is
merely acknowledged by the Fundamental Law, consequently constitutional identity
cannot be waived by way of an international treaty’.3)Decision 22/2016 AB of the
Constitutional Court of Hungary, para [68]. For a detailed analysis of the decision,
see Gábor Halmai, Abuse of Constitutional Identity. The Hungarian Constitutional
Court on Interpretation of Article E) (2) of the Fundamental Law, 43 Review of
Central and East European Law 23-42 (2018). Therefore, the Court argued, ‘the
protection of the constitutional identity shall remain the duty of the Constitutional
Court as long as Hungary is a sovereign State’.4)Ibid. This abuse of constitutional
identity was aimed at rejecting the joint European solution to the refugee crisis and
clearly flouted common European values, such as solidarity.
In a more recent decision, the Constitutional Court by ruling that the criminalization
of ’facilitating illegal immigration’ does not violate the Fundamental Law again
refered to the constitutional requirement to protect Hungary’s sovereignty and
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constitutional identity to justify this clear violation of freedom of association and
freedom of expression hiding behind the alleged obligation to protect Schengen
borders against ’masses entering [the EU] uncontrollably and illegitimately.’ (for more
detail see here). The Commission has brought several infringement actions against
Hungary for its handling of asylum claims and for its mistreatment of claimants, but
the Hungarian government rejects all “interference” from Brussels on this point.
The irony of Orbán’s rejection of the common asylum policy in particular and
European solidarity in general is that, when migration was at its height, more than
twice as many Hungarians approved of the EU’s leadership at the time as approved
of Viktor Orbán’s. As the results of the Gallup Poll indicate, below, in the summer
of 2015, at the height of the migration crisis, when Viktor Orbán was defending
Hungarians from international “invasion” while the EU was encouraging Hungary to
process the asylum claims of a mere 1293 refugees, the popularity of the EU soared,
while the popularity of the Hungarian government fell:
Source: Gallup, Snapshot: EU on Stronger Footing Than Orban in Hungary, Sept.
18, 2018.
And this was not a fluke. On the more general question of approval of the EU (and
not just of its leadership as in the prior question), Hungarians outdo all but one other
Member States in having a favorable view of the EU. In spring 2016, the first time
that the Pew Research Center surveyed Hungary after the migration crisis reached
its peak, only Poland surpassed the Hungarian public in its approval of the EU.
Evidently, the hard line that Europe had taken on migration did not provide a reason
for Hungarians, even if it provided a reason for Orbán, to abandon European values.
As we have seen, then, the Constitutional Court’s argument that national identity
requires closing the doors to Europe are not shared by the Hungarian population.
And if a national population doesn’t believe its state institutions’ assertions of
national identity against the core values of the European Union, what respect does
this national identity deserve?
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The respect for a Member State’s national identity – with its political structures
reflecting a commitment to democracy and its constitutional structures representing
the national values of the country – must depend ultimately on whether the citizens
of that state are willing to defend that national identity. But with this survey of the
Hungarian government’s (lack of) commitment to democratic governance and the
Hungarian public’s strong commitment to Europe, we can have a very different view
of the cross-pressures brought to bear on the European Union from Article 4(2) TEU.
Since there is neither democracy nor genuine constitutional identity to respect in
Hungary, given the way that both have been abused by the Orbán government, the
EU is more than justified in intervening to interrupt the tyranny of a one-party state.
In our present moment, the citizens of the most visible rogue state in the EU are
not like passengers who voluntarily bought a ticket to an illiberal destination and
are demanding to be taken there. If they were, then the democratic systems these
citizens have relied on to voice their preferences and the constitutional commitments
that these citizens have crafted might qualify as a genuine national identity under
Article 4(2) TEU. But when Member States full of European Union citizens are being
hijacked by their own governments to go to a non-European destination that they
never sought to visit, however, the Union’s commitments to national democracy
and national identity should lead it to intervene. In doing so, the Union would be
defending both EU principles as well as the importance of domestic democracy and
national identity. Article 4(2) and Article 2 are not in conflict when we consider rogue
Member States that have closed their national democratic space.  
We understand that von Bogdandy is justifiably nervous about the EU overriding
its Member States on matters of constitutional identity. But as we have tried to
show here, these are not normal times, nor are these normal and responsible
claims of constitutional identity. The values of Article 2 TEU were placed in the
legally operative part of the Treaty on European Union because they must be
guaranteed in order for the European Union to function. If democracy is hijacked,
courts are captured, rights are threatened and the EU is disrespected by a Member
State government, the sincere cooperation guaranteed in Article 4(3) cannot be
guaranteed. It will surely be both difficult and unpleasant for the EU to try to enforce
its values. But the rule of law crisis requires difficult and determined action to prevent
the foundations of European law from weakening to the point where the common
home that Europeans share collapses.
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